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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
LARRY DEAN COLEMAN, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20000626-CA 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
In addition to the facts and arguments contained in the State/Appellant's opening 
brief, the State submits the following argument in reply to the points contained in 
defendant/appellee's responsive brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CORRECTNESS REVIEW IS APPLICABLE AS THE STATE DOES 
NOT CHALLENGE THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT; 
DEFENDANT'S CONCESSION OF A THREE-DAY ERROR 
WARRANTS REVERSAL 
A. Review of the Determination of Whether "Good Cause" Exists Under 
Section 77-29-1 is a Legal Question Reviewed for Correctness 
The State appealed the dismissal with prejudice of three charges against defendant, 
arguing that the trial court erred in determining that, as of the time of the hearing on 
defendant's motion to dismiss, 114 days of the 120 days allowed under Utah Code Ann. § 
77-29-1 (1999) had passed. The three miscalculations made by the trial court cover the 
following dates: 1) March 27-30, 2000; 2) November 15-30, 1999; and 3) February 1-24, 
2000. 
Defendant erroneously claims that the State is challenging the trial court's findings 
of fact underlying its dismissal of the charges against defendant, and faults the State for 
failing to properly marshal the evidence supporting those findings, as would be required for 
such a challenge. Br. of Aplee. at 11-13, 18-19, 25-26. 
As to the March miscalculation, the trial judge erroneously believed that defendant 
filed a motion to dismiss on March 30, and concluded that the time tolled on that date (R. 
289:35). The State's opening brief points out that nothing in the record supports this 
determination. Instead, the only qualifying motion filed by defendant at the time which 
would have tolled the time would have been the motion to suppress filed on March 27 (R. 
39-47). As no evidence supported the trial court's finding of a March 30 filing date, there 
was nothing for the State to marshal. Further, defendant concedes that the trial court's 
finding was clearly erroneous. Br. of Aplee. at 13 n.7. The effect of this concession is 
discussed infra at subsection B. 
The State does not challenge any underlying findings as to the remaining two periods 
of miscalculation. The underlying procedural events are a matter of record. The dates and 
contents of hearings and motions have been recorded and clearly demonstrate what occurred 
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below. The trial judge did not make any factual findings which contradict the procedural 
events in this case which gave rise to the dismissal. 
Instead, the State challenges the trial court's verbal ruling, which is comprised of an 
explanation of how the judge calculated the time upon which his dismissal order was based 
and what may happen in the six days following the hearing (R. 289:32-37). As to the 
November 1999 delay, the trial judge ruled that defendant's unusual request to have the 
preliminary hearing set eighteen days beyond the period provided by statute did not toll the 
running of the time period (R. 289:32, 34). Defendant's request is a matter of record, and 
the judge made no findings of fact as to the request or the State's response thereto. He 
simply made the legal determination that the request did not toll the time period. It is that 
legal determination which the State challenges. 
Similarly, as to the February 2000 delay, the trial judge held that the entirety of the 
delay between January 20 and March 20 would not toll the running of the time period 
because there was "no reason . . . not to count those 60 days" (R. 289:33-34). The judge 
properly noted that the court "could not accommodate that [the preliminary hearing] at the 
attorney's request" but made no specific findings as to the various causes of the delays during 
that time. Again, the reasons for the delay are a matter of record, and the State does not 
challenge those facts. The State only challenges the court's determination that the reason for 
the delay from February 1 to February 24 did not toll the statutory time period. 
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The only question on appeal is the propriety of the trial court's determination as to 
whether or not what occurred below at each stage of the process tolled the running of the 
120-day statutory period. That question is one of law reviewed on appeal for correctness. 
See State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911, 914 (Utah 1998). 
B. March 27-30. 2000: Defendants Concession of a Three-Dav Error in the Trial 
Court's Computation Warrants Reversal 
Defendant concedes that the trial court erred in tolling the time period as of March 30, 
2000, instead of March 27, as argued in the State's opening brief. Br. of Aplt. at 11-12; Br. 
of Aplee. at 13 n.7. Consequently, as of the May 15, 2000, hearing on defendant's motion 
to dismiss, there were at least nine, not six, days remaining under the trial court's calculation 
of the 120-day period. This would have given the State three additional working days in 
which to bring defendant to trial. The State was prepared to try defendant within the six days 
but was unable to find a judge able to do so (R. 95-96; 289:35-37). Although the judge in 
this case could not schedule the trial within six days, nothing in the record suggests that this 
or another judge would not have been able to accommodate this case in nine days.1 In light 
of the severity of the remedy available to defendant in this case, the prosecutor's lack of 
responsibility for three of the four lengthy delays in this case, and the absence of anything 
lThe hearing was held on a Monday, and nine days would have expired on the 
Wednesday of the following week. The record reflects only that the judge in this case had 
"trials set for the rest of the week[,]" and gives no indication about the state of the court's 
calendar for the following week (R. 289:33). 
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to suggest that trial could not be had within nine days of the hearing date, reversal is 
warranted. 
Defendant contends, without supporting authority or analysis, that the State already 
had the full nine days to bring the case to trial and failed, negating any need for a remand. 
Br. of Aplee. at 13 n.7. However, because of the timing of defendant's motion and the 
hearing thereon, as well as the three-day error made by the court in calculating the statutory 
period at that hearing, the prosecutor had no reason to believe he had more than six days 
within which to act. Because the court and the parties contemplated that only trial within six 
days would satisfy the statute, the State should not be penalized for failing to schedule a trial 
beyond that time.2 
2Defendant includes a chart in Addendum E of his brief purporting to visually 
demonstrate the trial court's calculation, the State's calculation, and his own calculation 
of the 120-day period. However, the chart is inaccurate in several respects. First, the trial 
court considered and calculated into its decision only six days following the hearing on 
defendant's motion to dismiss, not the nine days noted on defendant's chart (R. 289:36-
37). Second, contrary to defendant's chart, the State has at no time included in its 
calculation of the statutory time period any more than six days following the May 15 
hearing date. To the extent the period is relevant at all, it cannot be counted against the 
State as defendant's failure to submit his order more timely is the sole cause of any 
additional delay. Third, inclusion of the three extra days in defendant's calculation, as 
shown by the chart, occurs without authority or analysis. Absent justification, his 
inclusion of it is erroneous. His inclusion of eighteen days additional days is addressed at 
Point 1(E), infra. 
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C November 15-30.1999: Defendant's Alternative Basis for Affirming the 
Court's Refusal to Toil these Fourteen Days is Specious, and His 
Manipulation of the Calendar to Temporarily Suspend the State's Ability 
to Bring him to Trial Constitutes "Good Cause" to Toll the Time 
1. Defendant's proposed alternative basis for affirmance lacks record and 
legal support 
The State contends that the fourteen-day November delay caused by defendant's 
request for a delayed setting of the preliminary hearing should toll the statutory period. Br. 
of Aplt. at 12-13. In response, defendant presents two arguments, neither of which has merit. 
Defendant claims that the trial court's refusal to toll the time during this period can 
be affirmed on the alternative basis of the absence of a discovery response by the State. Br. 
of Aplee. at 19. This is based solely on the following statement made by defense counsel at 
roll call below: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We'd like to set this for preliminary hearing, 
your Honor, approximately a month away, but (inaudible) discovery and 
(inaudible). 
(R. 285:2). The court then granted a hearing date for twenty-eight days later (id.). 
This Court may affirm a trial court's ruling on an alternative ground where that 
ground is "apparent on the record" and is sufficiently briefed by the appellee. State v. 
Chevre, 2000 UT App. 6, f 12, 994 P.2d 1278. Neither of these requirements has been met. 
Defendant's claim that discovery had not been received is not "apparent on the 
record." The record demonstrates that defense counsel requested discovery four days before 
roll call occurred (R. 12-13). In that discovery request, defendant requested that the 
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discovery "be provided to defense counsel . . . no later than three days prior to roll call 
presently set for November 2, 1999" (R. 12). Thereafter, in his argument on his motion to 
dismiss, defense counsel could not remember what he had said about discovery and did not 
remember whether he had received discovery before roll call (R. 289:28). The trial court 
made no discovery-related ruling below. Nothing in the record indicates that the prosecutor 
did not meet defendant's demand or that she delayed in releasing the discovery material to 
a degree justifying a fourteen-day delay in the prosecution of this case. Hence, there is no 
record basis for defendant's argument. 
Further, defendant fails to sufficiently brief the point where he concedes that he 
sought to delay the preliminary hearing, and he provides no record evidence that his 
discovery request had not been complied with and no authority that such a situation justifies 
a continuance of a preliminary hearing. Accordingly, defendant's argument is specious and 
fails for lack of merit. 
2. Defendant's manipulation of the preliminary hearing setting to the 
State's detriment constitutes "good cause" to toll the statutory period and 
should not be sanctioned 
Where a defendant unduly delays matters, the delay may be charged against him and 
the 120-day period extended. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916; State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325, 
1329-30 (Utah 1986); State v. Velasquez. 641 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982). 
Defendant claims that he has an inalienable right to a preliminary hearing which 
cannot toll the statutory time period. Br. of Aplee. at 19-21. The State has never sought to 
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deny defendant that right. The speedy trial statute necessarily contemplates the holding of 
a preliminary hearing in a timely and appropriate fashion. However, defendant's exercise 
of his right to a preliminary hearing can, under proper circumstances, act to toll the statutory 
time period. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916. In Heaton, defendant waived his preliminary 
hearing, appeared thirty days later on the date set for trial, then changed his mind and 
asserted his right. Id They conducted the preliminary hearing in lieu of the trial, defendant 
was bound over, and an arraignment was set for eighteen days later. Id. Asa new trial date 
could not even be considered until after the arraignment, the eighteen-day-delay was found 
to toll the statutory time period. Id. 
Similarly, defendant here chose not to avail himself of a preliminary hearing within 
ten days, as provided by Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(g)(2). Instead, he unilaterally 
sought a delay in the proceedings for reasons known only to him, and succeeded in 
suspending the prosecutor's ability to comply with the speedy trial statute for fourteen days. 
But for defendant's manipulation of the trial court's calendar, the preliminary hearing would 
have been held at least eighteen days earlier-three days before the effective date of his 
disposition notice. As in Heaton, the delay in the scheduling of the preliminary hearing was 
solely attributable to defendant's manipulation and therefore constitutes "good cause" for the 
tolling of the statutory time period. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 914; see also Velasquez, 641 
P.2datl l6. 
8 
D. Feb, 1-24, 2000: Both the absence from the preliminary hearing of a 
witness necessary only to the defense and the accommodation of defense 
counsel's schedule constitute "good cause" to toll the time period 
Defendant contends that the trial court properly refused to toll the period between 
February 1 and 24 for three reasons: 1) a necessary witness was absent from the preliminary 
hearing; 2) the prosecutor required a 9:00 a.m. setting; and 3) the prosecutor failed to insist 
on an earlier setting. Br. of Aplee. at 26-28. The first reason is solely attributable to 
defendant as the witness was necessary only to him, and defendant admitted below he should 
have known the witness would not be present (R. 286:4-6, 72). The second reason has no 
record support where the prosecutor's choice of a 9:00 a.m. setting was simply the "better" 
of two times offered by the trial court and not a requirement (R. 286:71). The third reason 
does not support the trial court's refusal to toll the time as the prosecutor has no duty to insist 
on a trial setting which cannot be accommodated by opposing counsel or the court, and 
defendant presents no authority to the contrary. Moreover, none of these reasons is relevant 
to the reason for the delay between February 1 and 24. 
The trial court stopped the January 20 preliminary hearing because the judge had 
another commitment (R. 286:71), and continued the hearing because of both the commitment 
and defendant's need to subpoena Officer Geer (R. 286:5, 71-72). In so doing, the court 
noted that February 1 was the next date available to schedule the remainder of the hearing 
(R. 286:71). Consequently, the court's other commitments and the need for Officer Geer's 
presence would have necessitated a delay from January 20 to February 1. The prosecutor 
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was available on that date (id.). However, defense counsel was unavailable on that date due 
to an unspecified scheduling conflict (id.). Accordingly, the sole reason the hearing was not 
set for February 1 but was set at the next available court date of February 24 was to 
accommodate defense counsel's schedule. As the final twenty-three day delay was 
attributable solely to defense counsel, the delay constitutes "good cause" as a matter of law 
and tolls the statutory period under section 77-29-1. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917 (extending 
the trial date, even in part, to accommodate defense counsel's schedule "constitutes 'good 
cause' under section 77-29-1(3) and (4)"); State v. Bonnv. 477 P.2d 147, 148 (Utah 1970) 
(same). 
E. Defendant's Attempt to Add Eighteen Days to the Calculation Fails 
Because it Lacks Supporting Record Evidence and is Contrary to Case 
Law 
Defendant attempts to add eighteen days to the trial court's calculation by arguing that 
the 120-day period began to run on October 28 instead of November 15. Br. of Aplee. at 21-
24. His claim fails as it has no record support and is contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in State v. Heaton. 
The record reflects that defendant signed his disposition notice on October 28, 1999 
(R. 45), and that someone at the prison received it on November 15, 1999 (id.).3 Despite 
3The specific date indicated on the stamp was unclear to the court and counsel 
below (R. 42; 289: 4, 10, 12, 14, 15, 32). Without objection from the parties, the trial 
court settled on November 15 as the date of receipt, making November 16 the "operative 
date to begin calculating the 120-day period" (R. 289:32). 
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defendant's repeated assertions that he delivered his written notice to prison authorities the 
same day he executed it (R. 39-40; 289:4, 10), and his argument that delivery should be 
implied as of that date because of the prison's allegedly slow handling of the related 
paperwork thereafter (Br. of Aplee. at 22-24), there is no evidence establishing a delivery to 
prison authorities any earlier than the November 15 prison stamp (R. 42; 289:12-13). If the 
execution and delivery date are assumed to be the same in this case, the assumption would 
apply to all cases, thereby defeating the statutory language. As the record does not support 
defendant's claim that he delivered the document on October 28, his claim fails. 
Further, in Heaton, the Utah Supreme Court held that although defendant completed 
his disposition request on August 25, 1994, "the 120-day disposition period commenced on 
September 3, 1994, the date on which an authorized agent at the prison received Heaton's 
written notice." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916. This Court is obligated by principles of stare 
decisis to follow supreme court decisions. See State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393,399 n.3 (Utah 
1994), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 1115 (1995). Pursuant to Heaton. the 120-day disposition 
period in this case necessarily began on November 15, as determined by the trial court, and 
defendant's claim to the contrary is without merit.4 
4While the trial court was correct in determining that the 120-day period would 
normally commence on November 15, the State contends that the period was tolled to and 
including November 30-the date on which defendant's preliminary hearing was originally 
set. See Point IC, supra. 
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POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S OWN FAILURE TO INCLUDE WITHIN THE SCOPE 
OF HIS DISPOSITION REQUEST TWO OF THE CHARGES 
AGAINST HIM DID NOT TRIGGER THE STATUTE AS TO THOSE 
CHARGES 
Defendant must provide certain specific information in a written disposition request 
in order to trigger application of the speedy trial statute. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1. As the 
pre-printed document entitled "Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges(s) 
[sic]" purports to contain all the requisite information pursuant to section 77-29-1(1), the 
prosecutor is justified in relying on the information in the written notice in determining the 
scope of the disposition request. As the request referred only to the "clandestine lab" charge, 
it did not trigger the speedy trial statute as to the remaining two charges. See Br. of Aplt. at 
15-19. 
Moreover, while defendant argues that his disposition request and the "Office 
Memorandum" which accompanied it encompass all three charges, he fails to recognize that, 
by its language, the memorandum was directed to the prison authorities and does not appear 
to be part of the disposition information forwarded to the prosecutor. The document is 
entitled "Division of Institutional Operations - Office Memorandum" and reflects that the 
"Records Office" directs "Wastach [sic] Records" to "read and sign the attached (two 
pages)" (R. 45). It also directs that someone "Attach a signed & witnessed money transfer" 
to the memorandum, presumably for the prison's use in charging defendant's account for the 
cost of mailing the disposition notice (R. 45, 47). As it purports only to direct prison 
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authorities in their processing of the disposition request, there is no reason to believe that it 
was included in the detainer documents sent to the prosecutor. This is supported by the fact 
that the prison's cover letter to the district attorney references defendant's disposition request 
and notes only two enclosures (R. 46). The logical inference is that the enclosures consisted 
of the disposition request and the "Certificate of Inmate Status" as these two documents 
contain the information called for in section 77-29-1(1) and (2) (R. 42-43). The prosecutor 
cannot use the memorandum to assess the scope of the disposition request if he never 
received it. 
Even if the "Office Memorandum" is considered in conjunction with the disposition 
request, it supports the State's argument in its opening brief that defendant failed to 
adequately comply with section 77-29-1(1), preventing the statute from applying to two of 
the three charges. In completing both the memorandum and the notice, defendant 
demonstrated that he knew the court and the case number of the proceedings dealing with the 
clandestine lab charge, knew there were multiple charges against him, and knew the nature 
of the charges differed (R. 42, 45). Defendant could not reasonably have acquired such 
information without also knowing the specific charges: the arrest warrant and the 
information, both filed prior to completion of the speedy trial notice, included the court and 
the case number and listed all three of the charges against defendant (R. 1-7). As defendant 
necessarily had the requisite information in front of him to trigger application of the statute 
as to all three charges, and the pre-printed form noted that he was to fill in the "fcjharges . 
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. . now pending against" him, defendant was on notice that he controlled the scope of the 
statutory right he was about to invoke (R. 42) (emphasis added). When, for whatever reason, 
he included only one of the three charges in his disposition request-—omitting two charges 
that were viable independent of the "clandestine lab" charge—he failed to give sufficient 
notice of his intent to invoke the extreme sanction of dismissal under the statute as to the two 
omitted charges. Hence, the time never commenced as to the omitted charges. See, e.g., 
Aranzav. State, 444 S.E.2d 349, 350 (Ga. App. 1994) (defendant's demand, which failed to 
identify the charges upon which he demanded a speedy trial by name, date, term of court, or 
case number "cannot reasonably be construed as sufficient to put the authorities on notice of 
defendant's intention to invoke the extreme sanction" of dismissal; hence, the time never 
commenced), cert, denied (9/8/94). There is no burden on the prosecutor or the court to have 
to search beyond the speedy trial notice to determine defendatnt's intent in invoking the 
speedy trial statute. Cf United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3rd Cir. 1998) (a 
disposition request under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers which does not include all 
the technical but essential information does not trigger the statutory period); see also Palmer 
v. Williams, 897 P.2d 1111, 1114 (N.M. 1995) (to trigger the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers, the request must be "clear, specific, and unambiguous"). 
CONCLUSION 
This is a case in which four separate delays occurred, none of which the State sought, 
only one of which the State agreed to, and all of which were occasioned by defendant. Yet, 
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the district court dismissed all charges for failure to timely prosecute. The State should not 
be made to suffer the most severe "penalty" of dismissal with prejudice where it held only 
minimal responsibility for the delay in bringing defendant to trial. 
This Court should reverse the trial court's dismissal of the case and remand the matter 
for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of June, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
S C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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